



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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France: The next French nuclear test is planned for 15 April at the Reggane test center, or as soon thereafter as meteorological and operational conditions permit. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] this test, the fourth conducted by France since 13 February 1960, will be France's last atmospheric test, and further tests beginning in the fall of 1961 will be underground. Since the resumption of the Geneva talks, the Soviet delegation has emphasized that continued French testing would make a test ban treaty "pointless," and Moscow is likely to issue an official warning to the US and Britain following the next test. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] The French test is certain to bring renewed protests from African states and may possibly complicate negotiations between France and representatives of the Algerian rebel government which are scheduled to open on 7 April.

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South Vietnam: [Growing discontent is reported among middle- and junior-grade officers of the South Vietnamese armed forces over the government's failure to check Communist guerrilla successes and to rally popular support; in addition, the officers are fearful that the Communists themselves might initiate an ostensibly non-Communist coup. []

[] discontent in the officer corps is greater than at any time since last November's attempted coup d'etat against President Diem. A restraining factor, however, is the realization that, without effective alternative leadership, any effort to replace Diem could lead to a Communist takeover. []

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
Iraq: [The anti-regime demonstrations in Baghdad continued on 28 March despite troops firing on demonstrators late Monday. Baghdad University is closed and its students]

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have joined the strike. A large part of the population is actively in sympathy with the strikers. Military Governor Abdi has cordoned off the nationalist quarter of Baghdad with troops and ordered a curfew. Troops have been ordered to shoot on sight anyone entering the quarter. (Map)

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Tanganyika-UK: [Julius Nyerere, chief minister of Tanganyika, is expected to urge British Colonial Secretary Macleod, who is chairing the constitutional conference now under way in Tanganyika's capital, Dar es Salaam, to announce an early date--possibly 1 October--for the independence of this East African trust] c/k

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[territory. While Macleod is expected to agree to eliminate the few remaining British controls over Tanganyika's internal affairs, he will probably attempt to maintain Britain's present schedule, which calls for independence in 1962, unless he is convinced that Nyerere's prestige would otherwise seriously decline.] [redacted]

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
Growing Discontent Among South Vietnamese Military Officers

Professional officers in South Vietnam have long felt that operations against the Communist guerrillas were hampered by political interference in assignments and field orders as well as by inadequate intelligence and faulty command structure. They have also been concerned that President Diem's reluctance to reform his authoritarian rule and his suppression of non-Communist political opponents are facilitating the Communist drive to take over South Vietnam.

While the bulk of army units remained loyal to Diem in last fall's paratroop revolt, the coup attempt increased the officers' awareness of the army's political potential. The government's subsequent mistrust of officers who did not give all-out support to Diem has also had an unsettling effect. Diem's foot-dragging in carrying out a promised government reorganization prompted [] to express doubt that Diem intended to do more than replace one group of "yes men" with another. [] a similar complaint was made recently by []

[] Early this month, a ranking officer of the 1st Infantry Division defected to the Communists.]

Uneasiness in the armed forces is intensified by the prospect of a major Communist political and military effort to disrupt the presidential election on 9 April. [Recent open Communist efforts to win the cooperation of non-Communists in front activity aimed at Diem's overthrow reportedly have led to some military talk of a "preventive coup."]



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Baghdad Demonstrations Growing More Serious

[Prime Minister Qasim returned to Baghdad from Basra on the night of 27 March in the face of increasing open hostility throughout the country. The strike began as a protest by taxi and bus drivers against an increase in the price of gasoline but expanded into an anti-regime movement by various elements, including the Communists. Led by Baghdad University students, demonstrators stoned buses again on 28 March in downtown Baghdad. Numerous shops have closed after pressure from the students for a general strike. Although troops fired on demonstrators on 27 March, they may be reluctant to carry out extreme repressive measures against a cause supported by the general populace. Sympathy strikes have broken out in Kirkuk and Mosul in the north and Najaf and Karbala in the south.]

[Recurring strife between groups of Kurdish tribesmen in the Mosul-Kirkuk area appears to be increasing, although Iraqi security authorities so far have relied on police detachments to maintain order. While army troops have not yet been involved in the tribal difficulties, the regime is not likely to call them to Baghdad to assist in putting down the rioting there.]

[The disorders in Baghdad may weaken the effect of recent moves against the Communists by the Qasim regime, unless Communist participation can be demonstrated. Qasim, in a speech on 28 March, blamed "imperialists and foreign companies," an apparent slap at the Iraq Petroleum Company, with which he has been engaged in fruitless negotiations for some months.]

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Tanganyika to Seek Independence at Constitutional Conference

[The conference began on 27 March in an atmosphere of general good feeling and is expected to adjourn on 30 March without serious difficulties. The only problems expected to arise are those related to the actual date for independence and the terms of separation pay for the departing British civil servants.]

[London has already promised early independence for Tanganyika but is reluctant to set a date earlier than 1962 because of the political situation in Britain and in its other African territories. Nyerere, an able and moderate nationalist, reportedly told Minister of Home Affairs Kahama that he is determined to hold out for independence in 1961. Nyerere probably hopes that by taking a strong position at the conference he can appease the more radical members of his own party and undermine the popularity of the rival--and increasingly extremist--African National Congress (ANC).]

[The Colonial Office has already assured Nyerere that Tanganyika can achieve "full internal self-government" at his discretion--probably in June 1961. This would include removing Governor Sir Richard Turnbull as chairman of the Council of Ministers (cabinet) and replacing him in that capacity by Nyerere, possibly eliminating the post of deputy governor, and replacing the two remaining government ministers with elected African ministers acceptable to Nyerere. Macleod is also expected to agree to an early transfer to the Tanganyika Government of control over the remaining expatriate civil servants and to make a generous offer regarding salaries and separation pay.]

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